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We have heard many bad things about the U.S. government and government
regulation; people have argued that there is either too little or too much
regulation in U.S. agriculture. I am going to say a few good things about the
U.S. biotechnology regulatory regime.
As you all know, regulation serves a role in safeguarding the environment
and assuring food safety in the agricultural industry, and product safety,
efficacy, and the consistency of the manufacturing process in the pharma-
ceutical industry. In both the food and pharmaceutical industries, regulation
and government approval raise consumer confidence and provide com-
panies with a powerful marketing tool — the label that says “USDA” or
“FDA approved.” The industry wants regulation. One only has to recall the
case when Richard Godown from the Biotechnology Industry Organization
and Rebecca Goldburg from the Environmental Defense Fund went jointly
to the Council on Competitiveness asking the council to please not
deregulate too much.
On the other hand, there is legitimate concern about regulation stifling
innovation, the economic implications of regulation, and questions of
international competitiveness in comparison to Europe and Japan. Over
the years, the EPA has been criticized for not issuing its policy guidelines
on time; the USDA for over-regulating or deregulating the wrong crops; the
FDA for its long review times and requirements that were supposedly
greater and more burdensome than their European counterparts.
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Hence, the desire for regulation and the fear of regulation are hostages of
each other. To have the seal of approval on your product, you need
regulation. And regulation is always slower than no regulation.
In the case of biotechnology, the relationship between regulation and eco-
nomic development has been at the center of all regulatory debates, I be-
lieve more so than in any other industry. There are three reasons for this
phenomenon. First, the technology is thought to hold enormous economic
promise and social benefit. Second, the industry is composed of many small
start-up companies with limited resources to devote to regulatory affairs.
Third, we are dealing with a sophisticated industry whose players have
been, from its origin, very involved in regulatory matters. It was the
scientists who came to Asilomar in the 1970s, many of whom subsequently
became the founders of biotechnology start-up companies and the industry
as a whole.
Many years later, the major question is: Has regulation negatively or
positively affected the development of the U.S. biotechnology industry? I will
speak to this subject in comparison to Europe. I will primarily address the
regulation of plant biotechnology, but will also mention the regulation of
the medical biotechnology industry because the pharmaceutical industry is
prominent on this year’s program. I will begin with my conclusions.
CONCLUSIONS
• The U.S. plant biotechnology industry has been positively affected by
domestic regulation and finds itself at a competitive regulatory
advantage to its European counterpart.
• The industry has, however, been negatively affected by European
regulation, in that companies hesitate to develop export crops for the
European market or make investments in Europe because of perceived
regulatory uncertainty.
• The U.S. medical biotechnology industry is domestically subject to
very burdensome and stringent regulatory requirements. The industry
is, however, not more disadvantaged than its European counterpart,
because both regulatory regimes are costly and provide few incentives
for the regulator not to err on the side of caution.
Those conclusions, as well as the subsequent arguments, are based on
studies of companies with similar operations in Europe and the United
States, of which I will give you an example. I call it: A Tale of Two
Companies.
A TALE OF TWO COMPANIES
This is the example of a U.S. and a German based company, both of which
developed a virus resistant crop, a squash, and a sugarbeet. Each crop raised
very similar regulatory concerns in each country, i.e. questions of gene trans-
fer and cross-compatibility with wild relatives. In order to gain a permit for
field testing the crop, the U.S. based company faced a one-step regulatory
process involving primarily the USDA-APHIS. The German based company
instead faced a three-step regulatory process. The company first needed to
submit its application to the national authority. The national authority in-
turn sent a summary of the company’s dossier to the European Commission,
that, in-turn, sent the summary dossier to all member states of the European
Union.
As far as the applications are concerned, the U.S. application consisted
of 21 pages: seven pages on host and recipient organisms, vectors, and
the genetically modified crop; four pages on the purpose of the field test,
methods of data collection and harvest procedures; and one paragraph on
the location and supervisory personnel. The remaining pages were graphs to
support the above. The German application consisted of 100 pages: 60 pages
on host and recipient organisms, vectors, and the genetically modified crop;
30 pages on the purpose of the field test and environmental risk; and 10
pages on company personnel and the supervision of the test.
Monitoring requirements in the U.S. call for only an annual field trial
report, while the German company must issue a mid-trial and final envi-
ronmental assessment report. In a 1995 article in Bio/Technology, Margaret
Mellon and Jane Rissler showed that the U.S. monitoring requirements are
inconsistently implemented by the USDA, while in Germany the imple-
mentation is consistent.
The initial review time for the U.S. application was 118 days. This number
was reduced as the agency gained experience with the company’s product
and subsequent field trials were approved much more rapidly. In Germany,
the approval took 175 days, followed by an appeal to court that added 32
days to the overall approval time.
The overall cost was greater in Europe than in the U.S. The estimated cost
of company regulatory affairs time in the U.S. was $5,000, while in Germany
it was approximately $100,000. An application fee does not exist in the U.S.
but is in the range of $7,500 to $45,000 in Germany, dependent on the time
and effort it takes the agency to review the application. A legal cost that
is not an issue in the U.S. was estimated by the German company to be
approximately $100,000.
This company comparison illustrates what I call the American regulatory
advantage in plant biotechnology. The American regulatory advantage in
plant biotechnology is two-fold. It consists of the regulatory regime per se,
and companies’ regulatory proficiency.
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THE REGULATORY REGIME
Regulatory Structure: The U.S. regulatory regime is much more centralized
than its European counterpart and presents fewer regulatory hurdles to the
company.
Regulatory Requirements: The U.S. regulatory requirements are far less
burdensome than their European counterpart where more data regarding the
environmental safety of the field test, the specifications of release conditions,
and the monitoring and control of test sites are required.
Stringency: U.S. regulatory requirements are less stringent than their
European counterpart.
Regulatory Style: The U.S. regulatory agencies are less legalistic than their
European counterparts, clearer in their requirements, more cooperative, and
less adversarial.
Review Times: Review times are consistently faster in the U.S. This is more
so since the introduction of the notification process for well-characterized
crops.
Regulatory Certainty: In comparison to Europe, the U.S. issued its guidelines
for field-testing genetically modified crops and the commercialization of trans-
genic foods much earlier.
Statutory Flexibility: In the U.S., a single agency can adapt to technical
progress given requirements and policies. In Europe instead such decision has
to be taken by the European Commission and in part with the agreement of
the European Parliament.
Other speakers may discuss whether these U.S. regulatory advantages come
at a cost of increased environmental risk and reduced safety. I believe that
one can have an efficient regulatory regime that safeguards the environment.
The second important part of the American regulatory advantage is the
companies’ regulatory proficiency or their capacity to respond to regulatory
challenges.
COMPANY REGULATORY PROFICIENCY
Company Organization: U.S. biotechnology companies are staffed with a
director for regulatory affairs who is actively involved in product development.
In Europe it is often the lead scientist who interacts with the regulator.
Company Experience: U.S. biotechnology companies are often experienced
in dealing with environmental regulation, as often they are managed and/or
staffed by former employees of the chemical industry (e.g. Mycogen’s CEO
formerly worked at Monsanto) or former employees of the EPA. Many
European companies have never been regulated on environmental grounds.
European regulators rarely move into the private sector.
Status of Regulation: Many U.S. companies consider regulation an integral
part of product development. Many European companies consider regulation
after they have developed their product.
Company Ingenuity: Some of the U.S. biotechnology companies established
relatively early proved to be extremely innovative and imaginative in their
response to regulatory challenges. European companies have not shown such
ingenuity.
Following the above, it is tempting to conclude that the success of the U.S.
agricultural biotechnology industry, in comparison to its European counterpart,
is in major part the result of the regulatory proficiency of both the industry
and government.
I conclude, however, that this is not entirely so. Regulation is only one factor
in a complex innovation system. While regulation is critical at certain stages
of product development, it rarely determines whether a company is founded,
an entrepreneur realizes his or her plans, a product gets developed, or a tech-
nology is adopted. Hence, it does not have a direct impact on innovation per se,
but is always reactive. Only in situations where there is extreme regulatory un-
certainty can regulation seriously affect the development of an entire industry.
Why have the same set of techniques generated so much more industrial
activity in the U.S. than in Europe (measured in terms of the number of field
tests)? I suggest the difference goes beyond regulation to the industrial orga-
nization in place at the time of the introduction of the technology.
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
When biotechnology was introduced, there was an established European chemi-
cal industry (e.g. Hoechst, Bayer, BASF) that was dominated by chemists who
were reluctant to enter biotechnology and had historically never been in the
seed business. On the other hand, the European seed industry consisted of
small- and medium-sized companies that were mostly family-owned and very
traditional in nature. They were slow to innovate, reluctant to go high-tech, and
had limited resources.
In contrast, the United States biotechnology industry consisted of start-up
companies and established chemical companies. The start-up companies were
very innovative and open to risk-taking, specialized in biotechnology tech-
niques, and were staffed by university researchers and molecular biologists with
close ties to the research community and the land grant institutions. Those
companies were highly dependent on product approval because of the need to
demonstrate to the venture capital community that they were worthy of fund-
ing. In most cases, the established chemical companies (Monsanto, Dow etc.)
were active in crop protection and, in some cases, the seed business. In the
1970s, many U.S. chemical and petro-chemical companies had bought into
seeds. The large chemical corporations also benefitted from the close proximity
of innovative start-ups. Finally, the U.S. industry consisted of the world’s largest
seed company (Pioneer) with large resources. This U.S. industrial organization
favored it over its European counterparts.
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In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the following points:
• Regulation plays an important role in assuring consumer confidence. This
is particularly so in a new industry such as biotechnology.
• A good regulatory framework, such as the U.S. framework for the regula-
tion of plant biotechnology, provides a support structure to industrial
development but is not critical to innovation.
• The largest responsibility for innovation, industrial development, and the
success of the regulatory process lies with individual companies, their
organization, and the industry as a whole.
